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NOTE
R ESURRECTING THE WOLF: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The fourth amendment1 safeguards an individual's property
interests from unreasonable governmental intrusion.2 The scope of
its protection extends to any interest in which one has a legitimate
expectation of privacy.3 To secure this right to privacy, the "rea-
' U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
2 See J. HIRSCHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 1 (1979); R. DAVIS, FEDERAL SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES 3-5 (1964). The fourth amendment reflects the theories of, among others, John
Locke, who stressed the sanctity of one's private property. See Note, Formalism, Legal Re-
alism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
90 HARv. L. REV. 945, 950 (1977). In both England and the American colonies, officials em-
ployed unrestricted search warrants or "writs of assistance" to search private homes for
incriminating papers and to harass colonists. See R. DAvis, supra, at 4. Such abuse drew
criticism from British scholars, including Lord Coke. Id. Public dissent also raged in the
colonies where the unreasonable search was proclaimed to be an "abuse that more than any
one single factor gave rise to American independence." Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145, 159 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Early state constitutions proscribed unrestricted search warrants in response to the
public outcry. See id. at 158 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). At present, every state has prohib-
ited unreasonable searches and seizures in its own constitution, often parroting the language
of the federal provision. See id. at 160-61 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); J. VARON, SEARCHES,
SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES 5-6 n.2 (1st ed. 1961).
3 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 739-40 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967). The Katz Court held
that the fourth amendment governs both the seizure of tangible items and the recording of
oral statements, thus dealing the final blow to the common law property rights theory. Katz,
389 U.S. at 353. No longer was it necessary that there be a physical intrusion into an en-
closed area or a seizure of a material object. Id.
The Court, in Smith, interpreted Katz as setting forth a two pronged test on the issue
of a "justifiable expectation of privacy." 442 U.S. at 740. First, the individual must have
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sonableness" and "warrant" clauses of the amendment have been
continually interpreted in relation to each other.4 Over the years,
however, the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its interpre-
tation of what constitutes a reasonable search and seizure. The
introduction of exceptions to the warrant requirement, 6 their sub-
sequent expansion, and the recent modification of the subsidiary
issue of probable cause 7 all serve to illustrate this concept.
"exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy." Id. Second, the subjective expecta-
tion must be "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'" (objective expecta-
tion). Id.
Despite the expansive Smith approach, standing requirements imposed in cases such as
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), have arguably revitalized the importance of having a
property interest. See id. at 134; see also infra note 22 (cases dealing with standing); Note,
Court Sanctioned Circumvention of the Fourth Amendment-United States v. Payner, 30
DE PAUL L. REV. 763, 767 (1981).
4 See New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960, 967 (1986) (test for reasonableness generally
means search conducted pursuant to warrant backed by probable cause); United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1965) (preference accorded searches under warrant). See
also Harris, 331 U.S. at 161-62, (1947) (Frankfurter, Jackson, JJ., dissenting) (subject to
"minor and severely confined exceptions" every search and seizure is per se unreasonable if
not conducted pursuant to valid warrant). The Court has not indicated whether one clause
takes precedence over the other. See Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident
to Arrest, 68 VA. L REV. 1085, 1092 n.30 (1982).
5 See generally United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950). The Court has
demanded a showing of probable cause for most criminal searches. See Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 558 (1978); see also infra note 7 (explanation of probable cause). In stop
and frisk situations, however, the Court has balanced the intrusion on the individual's pri-
vacy "against the opposing interests in crime prevention and detection and in the police
officer's safety." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979). This balancing approach
in the stop and frisk context originated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1968). Terry
held that where a reasonably prudent police officer reasonably suspects that under the cir-
cumstances his safety or that of others is in danger, he may make a reasonable search of a
person he suspects to be armed and dangerous, regardless of whether he had probable cause
to arrest him. Id. at 27. See also New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960, 968 (1986) (balance
three factors: officer's safety, degree of intrusion, and whether search stemmed from "proba-
ble cause focusing suspicion on the individual affected by the search"). Cf. Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (when suspicion of misconduct absent, balance "tilts in favor of free-
dom from police interference").
' See, e.g., Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1982) (plain view exception);
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621-22 (1977) (border searches); United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot pursuit). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,
295-96 (1973) (exigent circumstances); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)
(search pursuant to consent); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (stop and frisk). See
generally R. McNAIARA, CONSTITIMONAL LIMrrATIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 44-54 (1982)
(explanation of exceptions to warrant requirement).
' Compare Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (totality of circumstances analysis
held proper standard for probable cause determination) with Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410, 416 (1969) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) (combining to form more
rigid two-pronged test concerning probable cause in cases of anonymous tips to police). The
Court in Gates explicitly rejects the Aguilar-Spinelli test which required that the anony-
1986]
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Similarly, inconsistency marks the debate concerning suitable
methods of vindicating fourth amendment rights. Historically, ag-
grieved persons were relegated to two remedies, namely punish-
ment of the trespassing official and recovery of the seized chattel.8
At common law, all relevant evidence was admitted at trial, regard-
less of its source.9 When the remedy of excluding illegally obtained
evidence was first applied, it was considered an essential element
of the right itself.10
In Wolf v. Colorado," the Supreme Court discarded this rea-
soning and held the fourth amendment to be binding upon the
states, but did not force the states to adopt the exclusionary "rem-
edy".12 The Wolf Court held that a state was free to apply its own
mous message reveal the "basis of knowledge" and that it "provide facts sufficiently estab-
lishing either the 'veracity' of the affiant's informant, or, alternatively, the 'reliability' of the
informant's report." 462 U.S. at 228-29. The Court preferred a more "common sense" ap-
proach using the two prongs merely as factors in its determination. See id. at 230. The
Gates Court stressed the significance of supplementary "independent police investigation"
which tends to corroborate the details of an informant's tip. See id. at 241.
8 See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv. L.
REV. 1532, 1538 (1972) (remedies against officials); Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amend-
ment: The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 690 (same); Wig-
more, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A. J. 479, 481, 483
(1922) (civil action, criminal contempt and return of articles). The basic common law reme-
dies for victims of an unlawful search or seizure were actions for trespass, false arrest, false
imprisonment, assault and malicious destruction of property. See Geller, supra, at 690. In
early English trespass cases, absence of a lawful warrant precluded an officer's defense of
official justification. See Dellinger, supra, at 1538.
9 See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (1940). Dean Wigmore readily advocated the com-
mon law practice of admitting all relevant evidence, asserting that "[tihe judicial rules of
Evidence were never meant to be an indirect process of punishment." Id. See also Gangi,
The Exclusionary Rule: A Case Study in Judicial Usurpation, 34 DRAKE L. REV. 33, 39-41
(1985) (ascertainment of truth rationale for inclusion of all relevant evidence).
,o See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 622 (1886). In Boyd, the first case to apply the exclusionary rule, the Court found
a federal law requiring an individual to produce his private papers to be used as evidence
against him as violative of the fourth and fifth amendments. See 116 U.S. at 630, 638, The
Boyd Court considered their admission to be an invasion of the "indefeasible right of per-
sonal security, personal liberty and private property." See id. at 630. The Weeks court un-
equivocally stated that exclusion was an essential ingredient of the fourth amendment, with-
out which the amendment's protection "is of no value. . . [and] might as well be stricken
from the Constitution." 232 U.S. at 393. Weeks imposed a direct limitation upon the au-
thority of both the judiciary and the federal officials via the fourth amendment. Id. at 391-
92.
" 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
12 See id. at 33. The Wolf Court explicitly recognized the existence of other remedies to
vindicate fourth amendment rights due to a considerable "range of judgment on issues not
susceptible of quantitative solution." Id. at 28. Segregation of the exclusion remedy from the
rights guarded by the fourth amendment was inferred from the fact that the exclusionary
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effective remedy."3 This stance was subsequently overruled in
Mapp v. Ohio,'4 in which the Court declared the judicially created
exclusionary rule to be a constitutionally required remedy. 5 The
Court's current interpretation of the exclusionary rule has height-
ened the tension between Wolf and Mapp. 6
This Note will first consider the recent dilution of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule subsequent to Mapp, primarily fo-
cusing upon the Burger Court's ad hoc balancing approach to its
application. A comparison of the fourth amendment rule to exclu-
sionary measures under the fifth and sixth amendments will reveal
that exclusion under the latter two amendments are more readily
justifiable. Accordingly, this Note will argue that imposition of this
remedy upon the states with respect to the fourth amendment is
an unconstitutional exercise of the Court's supervisory power. In
this context, related principles of federalism and state autonomy,
including comity and finality of judgments, will then be discussed.
Finally, appropriate standards for the formulation of a remedy for
fourth amendment violations will be suggested.
EXCLUSION OF TANGIBLE EVIDENCE UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: SUPERVISORY POWER OR CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE
The Supreme Court's distaste for per se rules of exclusion has
rule was judicially created, rather than explicitly required by the Constitution. Id.
" See id. at 33. In so doing, the Court acknowledged the feasibility of the then existing
remedial measures employed by the states. Id. at 30-31 n.1.
14 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
" See id. at 655. The Mapp Court discussed the practical effects of the exclusionary
rule, including deterrence of illegal searches and seizures as well as maintenance of judicial
integrity. See id. at 657-60. Recognition of exclusion as an essential element of the right was
a prerequisite to imposition of the rule upon the states. See Wolf, A Survey of the Ex-
panded Exclusionary Rule, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 193, 218-19 (1963).
Three intermediary cases hastened the erosion of the Wolf "double standard." Strict
requirements on standing to challenge an illegal search or seizure were relaxed in Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265-67 (1960). In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960),
the Court officially rejected the "silver platter" doctrine which permitted federal courts to
use evidence obtained unlawfully by state officials. Id. at 215. Lastly, in Rea v. United
States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), the Court exercised its supervisory power to prevent a federal
official from transferring illegally seized evidence to state authorities and from testifying in
state court with respect to that evidence. Id. at 216-17.
11 See California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 921 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Rehnquist favors the "thoroughly defensible proposition" of Wolf. See id. Justices
Brennan and Marshall, however, continue to be strong proponents of the Mapp approach.
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 940 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1060 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 17-44
and accompanying text (discussion of Burger Court treatment of the exclusionary rule).
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been manifested most clearly by the balancing approach utilized
by the Burger Court in United States v. Calandra.7 In Calandra,
a grand jury witness refused to testify as to evidence obtained from
an unlawful search and seizure.18 Pursuant to a motion to sup-
press, the Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule to the
"fruits" of this evidence.1 9 The majority determined that the po-
tential injury caused by disruption of grand jury proceedings out-
weighed the highly dubious deterrent value of exclusion.20 The Ca-
17 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974).
"' See id. at 341. The respondent's place of business was searched pursuant to a war-
rant issued in connection with a gambling investigation. Id. at 340. Although the search
revealed no gambling paraphernalia, a federal agent who was aware of pending loansharking
investigations discovered and seized what he concluded to be a loansharking record. Id. at
340-41. The district court determined that Calandra need not testify before the grand jury
as to the loansharking records and granted his motion to suppress such evidence based upon
insufficiency of the affidavit supporting the warrant and the fact that the search exceeded
the warrant. In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 737, 746 (N.D. Ohio 1971), af'd, United States v.
Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972).
19 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354-55. The phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree," as ap-
plied to derivative use of evidence, originated in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939). This concept was first discussed in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920), in which the Court rejected the Government's contention that the fourth
amendment prohibits the use of illegally seized physical evidence but not the knowledge
derived therefrom. See id. at 391-92. In referring to the meaning of the fourth amendment,
the Court noted that "[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but
that it shall not be used at all." Id. at 392.
The "fruits" notion was subsequently elaborated on in determining whether the prod-
uct of an unconstitutional police action was admissible in evidence. See Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590 (1975). Therein, the Court declared that whether a confession had been ob-
tained by exploitation of an illegal arrest or whether the causal chain between the two acts
had been broken, "temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of
intervening circumstances, and . . . the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct"
are factors to be considered. Id. at 603-04 (citations omitted). The Court has also noted that
when there is a close causal connection between illegal police conduct and the fruits of that
activity, the purpose behind the exclusionary rule is substantially served. See Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979). Accord Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-
88 (1963) (rejected "but for" rule in determining attenuation of the taint). See generally 3
LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.4, at 612 (1978 & Supp. 1986) (discussing "fruit of the
poisonous tree").
20 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 350-52. The majority concluded that there was no incen-
tive for the official to disregard the fourth amendment's command to obtain an indictment
if the evidence would only be suppressed at trial as a result. See id. at 351. The Court
examined the unique role of the grand jury as an investigative body permitted to pursue its
function "unimpeded by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal
trial." Id. at 349. The Calandra majority also noted that the injury to the witness's privacy
rights could be redressed by remedies other than exclusion in the grand jury proceeding. See
id. at 354 n.10 (possible remedies for unlawful search and seizure include exclusion at trial
or action for damages).
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landra Court derived this balancing test from its earlier holding in
Alderman v. United States.21 In Alderman, the Court refused to
grant special standing to enable codefendants to vicariously assert
fourth amendment exclusion claims because the deterrent benefits
in extending the exclusionary rule in such cases were outweighed
by the strong public interest in prosecuting such parties.22 This
cost-benefit analysis has been subsequently employed in other con-
texts, thereby giving rise to several noteworthy exceptions to the
rule's application.23
The Court applied a similar weighing process in Stone v. Pow-
ell.2 4 The majority denied a state prisoner federal habeas corpus
Calandra's rejection of the exclusionary rule has been limited by some to the context of
a grand jury proceeding. See Smith v. United States, 423 U.S. 1303, 1306 (1975) (Douglas,
J., opinion in chambers); Comment, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule in the
Grand Jury Setting: United States v. Calandra, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 598, 599 (1974).
But see infra note 23 and accompanying text (Calandra cost-benefit analysis employed in
other contexts).
21 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348, 350-51 (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 174-75 (1969)).
22 See Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174-75. The Burger Court continues to enforce the stand-
ing requirement in search and seizure cases. See, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83,
85 (1980) (overruling automatic standing rule where possession of unlawfully seized evidence
is essential element of alleged offense); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978) (rejects
"target" theory whereby any defendant at whom search is "directed" can object to admis-
sion of seized evidence). The Court refused to use its supervisory power to permit an ac-
cused to vicariously assert another's rights under the fourth amendment. See United States
v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980). For a discussion of the standing requirement to assert
application of the exclusionary rule, see generally 3 LAFAvE, supra note 19, at § 11.3; Com-
ment, supra note 20, at 600-09.
22 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88 (1984) (evidence obtained
in good faith reliance on defective search warrant admissible); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (same); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 799, 813-14 (1984) (inde-
pendent source for search warrant renders admissible evidence obtained via warrantless en-
try); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984) (exclusionary rule exception where evidence
would inevitably have been discovered); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28
(1980) (illegally seized evidence admissible for impeachment purposes). See also Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40 (1979) (fruits of arrest made in good faith reliance on ordinance
subsequently declared unconstitutional held admissible); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 454 (1976) (evidence seized unlawfully by state officers admissible in federal tax
proceeding).
Despite the initial application of the balancing test to the "fruits" of the unlawful con-
duct in Calandra, it is obvious that this approach extends to the originally seized evidence
as well. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 913. It is also evident from the Court's decisions that the
Calandra test applies outside the grand jury context. See, e.g., id. at 913 (extending Calan-
dra to trial setting); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1984) (applying Calandra
analysis to civil deportation hearings); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492-94 (1976) (ex-
tending Calandra to habeas corpus setting).
2-4 428 U.S. 465, 493-95 (1976).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:716
relief despite the fact that illegally seized evidence had been intro-
duced at his trial, holding that he had been afforded an opportu-
nity for full and fair litigation of his fourth amendment claim.25
The minimal deterrent effect of exclusion in the habeas corpus set-
ting was considerably outweighed by the detriment to the
truthfinding process of the criminal justice system. 6 The trial
court's adequate opportunity to consider the claim seemingly satis-
fies the judicial integrity argument some still advance for applying
the rule.
The Calandra, Alderman, and Stone holdings have a signifi-
cant common denominator: the effective elevation of the deter-
rence rationale as the primary purpose of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule.28 Accordingly, the Calandra majority expressly
rejected the view that the rule was constitutionally required in all
25 See id. at 494. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its holding by noting that
the exclusionary rule has "minimal utility" when sought to be applied to fourth amendment
claims in a habeas corpus setting. See id. at 495 n.37. Cf. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,
560-61 (1979) (distinguishing habeas corpus reversal of conviction based upon racially dis-
criminatory grand jury selection from reversal based upon fourth amendment claims be-
cause in former case, trial court rather than police committed constitutional violation).
26 Stone, 428 U.S. at 490, 492-94. The Court considered the assumption that deterrence
would result if police feared that federal habeas corpus review might reveal previously unde-
tected flaws in searches or seizures dubious. See id. at 493. Critics of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule cite diversion from, and injury to, the truth-finding process in a criminal
trial as the rule's major flaw. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 277 (1978); Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 168, at 463 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); Seidman, Factual Guilt and the
Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 436, 449 (1980).
27 See Stone, 428 U.S. at 486. Courts would thereby be prevented from becoming ac-
complices to unlawful invasions of citizens' rights by admitting the "fruits of such inva-
sions." See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1967).
The Stone Court observed that the concern for judicial integrity has minimal force as a
justification for application of the exclusionary rule. See 428 U.S. at 485. See also infra note
64 and accompanying text (judicial integrity rationale cannot justify rule's imposition upon
states). Support for judicial integrity as a purpose of the exclusionary rule still can be found
in the minority opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall. See, e.g., Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 594 n.19 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (exclusionary
rule furthers "independent 'imperative of judicial integrity' "); United States v. Payner, 447
U.S. 727, 744-45 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (exclusion considered exercise of Court's
supervisory power to protect integrity of judicial system).
28 Although unsupported by empirical evidence, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule was at one time presumed. Stone, 428 U.S. at 492. This presumption has been essen-
tially abrogated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), wherein the Court noted that
deterrence is ineffectual in light of objectively reasonable police activity. See Leon, 468 U.S.
at 918-19. In general, the effectiveness of exclusion as a deterrent has been subject to exten-
sive criticism. See Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary
Rule and its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 276 (1973); Oaks, Studying the Exclusion-
ary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHL L. REV. 665, 671-72 (1970).
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cases. 29 The rule's aim is to protect society from future violations
of the amendment rather than to punish the offender or to specifi-
cally redress the individual's injury.30 Implicit in this stress upon
deterrence is the conceded recognition of equally effective alterna-
tive remedies.31
Contrast with Fifth Amendment
Initially, the exclusionary rules of the fourth and fifth amend-
ments were considered complementary.3 2  However, with the
Court's narrowing of the fifth amendment to a testimonial privi-
lege and its expansion of the fourth amendment to encompass any
legitimate privacy interest, this is no longer the case. 3 Despite its
terse wording, the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimi-
nation 34 encompasses two limitations on governmental authority:
19 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. The Court officially rejected the interpretation of the
rule as a "personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Id.
80 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347. "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its
purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. (quoting Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). The exclusionary rule was not intended to punish judges
and magistrates for their errors concerning issuance of warrants. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 916
(1984). Since there is no direct punishment levied against the erring official, some consider
the exclusionary rule to be an ineffective deterrent. See Oaks, supra note 28, at 709-10.
" See Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 181,
185 (1969) [hereinafter Hill, Supervisory Power]; Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 1109, 1118 (1969) [hereinafter Hill, Constitutional Remedies]. Professor Hill asserts
that unless a particular remedy is held to be an integral part of a constitutional right, sub-
stitutes will be permitted or at least considered as to their comparable effectiveness. Hill,
Supervisory Power, supra, at 185. This is particularly relevant due to the Constitution's
silence on the matter of remedies. Hill, Constitutional Remedies, supra, at 1118.
32 See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886). The initial invasion and seizure were considered violative of the fourth
amendment, while the admission of the seized evidence at trial violated the fifth. See
Gouled, 255 U.S. at 306; Note, supra note 2, at 959. Closely related to this interdependency
was the traditional "mere evidence" rule, which permitted the government to search only
for contraband, instrumentalities and fruits of the crime, but not for mere evidence. See id.
at 960. For a discussion of the rule, see generally Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and
the Reason, 54 GEO. L.J. 593 (1966). It was subsequently repudiated by the Court, see War-
den v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967), as a result of the Court's changing perspective as to
both the fourth and fifth amendments. See R. McNAmARA, supra note 6, at 32.
88 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302-06 (1967) (tangible items seized not subject
to fifth amendment privilege; shift under fourth amendment from property to privacy inter-
est); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (fifth amendment privilege does not
encompass use of blood taken from defendant as evidence); supra note 3 (expansion of
fourth amendment protection to encompass legitimate expectation of privacy).
34 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No
person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself... ... Id.
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the prohibition against coerced confessions and the safeguarding of
individuals from being compelled to testify against themselves.3 5
Although a distinction between the two limitations is no longer ob-
served, 6 the development of each concept in our case law has been
divergent.3 7 Both derive from the common law intolerance of the
old English inquisitorial practices.3 " Nevertheless, in finding the
extortion of confessions through "inducements engendering either
hope or fear"39 deplorable, the Supreme Court chose to impose this
prohibition against the states much earlier.40 The Warren Court
" See H. WAY. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 147 (1980); J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 2266 (Mc Naughton rev. ed. 1961). Dean Wigmore saw a clear distinction
between the "rule excluding untrustworthy Confessions" and the "rule giving a Privilege
against compulsory testimonial Self-Crimination." Id. at 401. As separate principles, the lat-
ter encompasses only in-court statements made by witnesses, whereas the broader "confes-
sion rule" also applies to out of court statements by the defendant. See id. Contemporane-
ously, Professor Morgan conceded the distinction, but recognized the self incrimination
privilege as encompassing the prohibition against confessions coerced by the police. See
Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1949).
3' See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964), in which the Court overruled the stance
taken in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), by incorporating the fifth amendment
privilege against compelled testimony into the fourteenth amendment as had previously
been done with respect to its counterpart confession rule. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 285 (1936). Thus, both privileges were extended to state proceedings. See Malloy, 378
U.S. at 6.
37 See J. WIGMORE, supra note 35, at §§ 818, 2250, 2266 (origins of two privileges differ
by one hundred years). A double standard evolved in Supreme Court decisions with respect
to the imposition of the two privileges upon the states. In Brain v. United States, 168 U.S.
532 (1897), the fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege controlled the issue of coerced
confessions in federal proceedings. See id. at 542. In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908), the Court refused to impose the "exemption from compulsory self-incrimination"
upon the states. See id. at 99. Twenty eight years later, the Court held that "[c]ompulsion
by torture to extort a confession is a different matter," and voided the conviction on due
process grounds. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936) (confessions extorted by
hanging and whipping accused void as violative of due process). Hence, until Malloy over-
ruled Twining, the states were bound by the confession rule but not by the privilege against
compelled testimony. See infra note 39.
" See D. NISSMAN, E. HAGEN, P. BROOKS, LAW OF CONFESSIONS 26-44 (1985) [hereinafter
LAW OF CONFESSIONS]; H. WAY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 133-36
(1980). See generally L. LEvY, ORIGINS OF THE FIrTH AMENDMENT (1968) (overview of com-
mon law inquisitorial practices and historical developments of fifth amendment).
3' Bran v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558 (1897). The Court in Brain declared that
the general rule as to confessions was that they are to be "free and voluntary." Id. at 557. In
that case, the Court described the broad fifth amendment privilege as "comprehensive
enough to exclude all manifestations of compulsion, whether arising from torture or from
moral causes." Id. at 548.
"I See supra note 37. For other early cases applying the privilege against coerced con-
fessions see Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53-55 (1949); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555
(1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228 (1940).
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stated in Miranda v. Arizona41 that custodial interrogation was in-
herently coercive, and thus significantly expanded the definition of
"coercion. '42 Demonstrating its displeasure with the strict Mi-
randa prophylactic rules,43 the Burger Court apparently chose to
revert to the traditional ad hoc voluntariness test for the admissi-
41 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
42 Id. at 457-58. The Miranda Court construed its earlier holding in United States v.
Malloy, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and the voluntariness doctrine as "encompass[ing] all interroga-
tion practices which are likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him
from making a free and rational choice." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 464-65. Viewing custodial
police interrogation as coercive by its very nature, see id. at 457-58, the Court disallowed the
use of statements stemming from this procedure absent a showing by the prosecution which
"demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination." Id. at 444. The Court then outlined a series of warnings which, if given to a
defendant prior to custodial interrogation provide the necessary protection. Id. at 467-73.
Such warnings and subsequent waiver of one's rights "are, in the absence of a fully effective
equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant." Id. at
476.
This set of procedural guidelines and the diversion from the traditional ad hoc volunta-
riness test was heralded as a necessary and logical means of assuring that the accused's
waiver of rights and his subsequent confession were truly voluntarily made. See Wright, A
Fresh Approach to the Law, in A NEW LOOK AT CONFESSIONS: ESCOBEDO-THE SECOND
ROUND 249-50 (B. George ed. 1967) [hereinafter THE SECOND ROUND]. Judge Wright praised
the shift in emphasis from the trial to the pre-trial period, and considered the right to an
attorney during interrogation necessary to avoid "secret inquisition." Id. Professor Kamisar
viewed the shift of focus on the police station as the next logical step in safeguarding the
self incrimination privilege. See Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some
Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the "Old Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L.
REV. 59, 66-67 (1966). He noted that the primary problem encountered in confession cases is
that custodial interrogations are secret proceedings absent any objective recordation of the
facts. Id.
43 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
423-24 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444-45, 450-51
(1974). In each of these cases, a distinction was made between the privilege against self-
incrimination and the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda. In Quarles, the Court held
that, under the circumstances of the case, overriding concerns for public safety justified the
police officer's failure to recite the Miranda warnings prior to his interrogation of the de-
fendant regarding the location of the abandoned weapon. See 467 U.S. at 656. Chief Justice
Burger, in his Brewer dissent, argued that a violation of a Miranda safeguard is not per se a
violation of the fifth amendment. See 430 U.S. at 423-24. In Tucker, Justice Rehnquist
viewed the Miranda safeguards as merely "provid[ing] practical reinforcement for the right
against compulsory self-incrimination," rather than as constitutional mandates. 417 U.S. at
444. See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986). The Moran Court stressed that the
underlying purpose of the Miranda rules was to "guard against abridgement of the suspect's
Fifth Amendment rights." Id. at 1143. The Court has further restricted the scope of Mi-
randa by limiting the definition of "custody." See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,
494-95 (1977) (voluntary visit to police station when not under arrest held not in custody).
See generally Lane and Grossman, Miranda: The Erosion of a Doctrine, 62 CHL B. REC. 250
(1981) (decline of Miranda under Burger Court).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:716
bility of potentially incriminating declarations. 44 This blanket ex-
clusion of involuntary statements under the fifth amendment ulti-
mately rests upon the greater potential for unreliability.45
Contrast with Sixth Amendment
The sixth amendment provides in part that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the As-
sistance of Counsel for his Defense."4  The right to counsel
originated in the common law privilege allowing an accused to be
represented at trial by his own attorney.47 It has been enlarged by
the Supreme Court to provide for state-appointed counsel for indi-
" See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). The Tucker Court held that al-
though the police failed to provide the accused with the full measure of Miranda safeguards,
he was not deprived of his privilege against self-incrimination because, despite this failure,
the statements were voluntarily made. Id. at 444-46. The Burger Court has similarly ne-
gated the per se rule of exclusion by permitting the use of statements obtained in violation
of Miranda for impeachment purposes, so long as the statements were voluntarily made.
See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1975). Likewise, in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S
649 (1984), the Court did not presume that the self-incriminating statement made by the
defendant was compelled because the police had failed to read him his Miranda warnings.
See id. at 672 n.5.
"' The trustworthiness standard, which prevailed at common law, see LAW OF CONFES-
SIONS, supra note 38, at § 1:2, was cited by the Burger court as a further justification for
excluding involuntary statements. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448 n.23
(1974) (mistrust of involuntary statements). The trustworthiness standard was officially dis-
carded by the Court in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), which held that involun-
tary statements were to be excluded regardless of their truth or falsity. Id. at 540-41; see
also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964). The concept of trustworthiness, none-
theless, is frequently used to distinguish exclusion of testimonial evidence from suppression
of tangible evidence. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638 (1965); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 951 (1965). This reliability issue is easily disregarded in the
fourth amendment context insofar as tangible evidence is inherently reliable. See Leon, 468
U.S. at 907.
46 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment also protects an accused's right "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." Id. Violation of this right may lead to exclusion
of prior testimony which was not subject to adequate cross examination. See Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965). For purposes of this Note, discussion of the sixth amend-
ment will focus upon the right to counsel.
4" See W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 30 (1955); LAW OF CON-
FESSIONS, supra note 38, at § 7:2; H.F. WAY, supra note 35, at 287. In eighteenth century
England, the right to appear with counsel was usually limited to cases in which the state's
interest was so minor that it could afford to be generous, such as those involving misde-
meanor defendants and civil litigants. See W. BEANEY, supra, at 8. It was denied to felony
defendants unless the charge was treason. See id. at 9. However, each of the original thir-
teen states granted some form of increased protection. Id. at 21. Prior to ratification of the
sixth amendment, Congress had passed several acts granting a general right to representa-
tion by counsel. See id. at 28.
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gent defendants,48 and is no longer limited to the actual trial set-
ting.4 9 The right to counsel has consistently been viewed as a nec-
essary corollary to an accused's due process right to be heard and
receive a fair trial,50 and intertwines with the privilege against self-
incrimination.51 Accordingly, statements extracted in violation of
the right to counsel are suppressed.52
Supervisory Power
The Supreme Court's recent limitations on the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule have evoked doubts as to whether it can be
constitutionally imposed upon the states.5 This has raised ques-
4' In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court held that in certain capital cases
due process required that the state assign counsel to the accused. Id. at 71. This right was
subsequently extended to all capital cases, see Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 674 (1948), and
then to all felonies in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). See generally W.
BEANEY, supra note 47, at 38-79 (expansion of right to counsel for indigents).
49 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964); LAW OF CONFESSIONS, supra note
38, at § 7:3. It was not until the Escobedo holding that the right to counsel was recognized
beyond the trial setting. 378 U.S. at 490-91. "[W]here ... the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect," that
suspect is entitled to an opportunity to consult with an attorney. Id. It has been extended
beyond the trial setting to encompass critical stages of a prosecution. Id. Such critical stages
include arraignments, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1961), preliminary hearings,
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970), post-indictment lineups, United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967), and post-trial revocation of probation, Mempa v. Rhay, 389
U.S. 128, 137 (1967).
11 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
68-71 (1932).
5' See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470-75 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478, 488 (1964). The presence of an attorney will ensure that any coercive police practices
are reduced, thus "mitigat[ing] the dangers of untrustworthiness." See Miranda, 384 U.S. at
470. Escobedo recognized the right of the accused to be advised by an attorney of his rights,
including his right to remain silent. See 378 U.S. at 488.
52 See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91 (no statement elicited by police during interroga-
tion is admissible if request for counsel is denied); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,
206-07 (1964) (incriminating statements elicited by federal agents from defendant in ab-
sence of his attorney not admissible). But see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 449-50 (1984).
In Nix, the Court held the inevitable discovery rule applicable to evidence obtained as the
"fruit" of a sixth amendment violation. Id. at 447-48. Stressing deterrence as the purpose of
excluding such evidence, the Court adopted a balancing test similar to that used in the
fourth amendment cases. See id.; supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. Applying the
balancing test, the Nix Court stressed the detrimental effect that suppression would have on
"the integrity of the fact finding process" in such a case, and noted its minimal effect as a
deterrent. Nix, 467 U.S. at 446. The right to counsel has not been recognized in several non-
trial settings such as: grand jury proceedings, United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581
(1976); post-indictment photographic displays, United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321
(1973); pre-indictment lineups, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
13 See, e.g., Wingo, Rewriting Mapp and Miranda: A Preference for Due Process, 31 U.
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tions concerning the doctrine of supervisory power, defined as the
ancillary authority of the judiciary to formulate procedural rules,
subject to concurrent and superseding congressional authority.5
Traditionally, it was invoked by the Court to impose standards
upon lower federal courts to achieve a fair and orderly administra-
tion of justice, beyond those mandated by the Constitution.5 The
supervisory power has been employed to establish rules of evidence
and to regulate conduct outside the courtroom which violates fed-
eral law.56 Its greatest impact has been in the criminal justice
area.
57
KAN. L. REv. 219, 227, 234 (1983) (as currently construed, neither Mapp nor Miranda may
be constitutionally imposed upon states); Note, Standards for the Suppression of Evidence
under the Supreme Court's Supervisory Power, 62 CORNELL L. Rnv. 364, 368 (1977) (if char-
acterization as remedial deterrent prevails, states may be able to devise alternative
deterrents).
54 See Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1433, 1468,
1472 (1984). Commentators agree that the general supervisory power is derived from Article
III of the Constitution. See id. at 1468-72; Note, A Separation of Powers Approach to the
Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 34 STAN. L. REv. 427, 439 (1982).
55 See Casenote, Limiting Exclusion of Evidence Under the Federal Court's Supervi-
sory Power with a Fourth Amendment Sword: United States v. Payner, 22 B.C.L. REv. 567,
582-83 (1981); Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEo.
L.J. 1050, 1050 (1965). Historically, the supervisory power has been exercised to regulate
courtroom conduct. Note, supra, at 1052-56. Such regulation may be effectuated by finding
an abuse of discretion in the trial court, particularly if the issue is the improper conduct of a
judge. See id. at 1056-57. This type of judicial housekeeping traces back to the English
system in which courtroom procedure was regulated on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 1054-55. Even
if confined to regulating courtroom procedure, problems of inconsistency arise when the su-
pervisory power is invoked by the lower courts. See Beale, supra note 54, at 1455-62.
81 See Beale, supra note 54, at 1434; Imwinkelried, United States v. Payner and the
Still Unanswered Questions about the Federal Court's Supervisory Power Over Criminal
Justice, 7 NAT'L. J. CRIM. DEF. 1, 15 (1981). The modern version of the supervisory power
has been characterized as a "prophylactic tool to counter government misconduct." Im-
winkelried, supra, at 11. The expansion beyond judicial housekeeping originated in McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), in which the Court suppressed confessions obtained
by arresting officers in violation of a federal statute that required that "the person arrested
shall be immediately taken before a committing officer." Id. at 342. The Court granted sup-
pression even though it conceded that the confessions were voluntary and, thus, not viola-
tive of the fifth amendment. See id. at 341; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
223 (1960) (evidence seized unlawfully by state officers held inadmissible in federal proceed-
ings); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1956) (supervisory power prevented fed-
eral official from testifying in state court). Invocation of the supervisory power to exclude
evidence obtained in violation of standards more stringent than those constitutionally man-
dated allegedly serves several objectives: to preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings; to
remedy violations of individual rights; and to impose sanctions against government miscon-
duct. See Beale, supra note 54, at 1495.
57 See Beale, supra note 54, at 1434. Use of the supervisory power has been considera-
bly reduced by the Burger Court. See, e.g., Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 350 (1984)
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The use of this supervisory power to impose extraconstitu-
tional measures has drawn considerable criticism concerning po-
tential separation of powers conflicts.58 For this reason, it has been
suggested that the exercise of supervisory power be confined solely
to regulation of procedure within the courtroom.5 9 The Supreme
Court has further noted the possible infringement on state auton-
omy and has responded by declaring that, under the guise of the
exercise of supervisory power over the states, basic principles of
federalism are vitiated. 0 Accordingly, federal review of state court
decisions is limited to determining whether there has been a con-
stitutional violation.6 1
It is submitted that imposition of the fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule upon the states is an impermissible exercise of su-
pervisory power. Since its basis rests in deterrence rather than vin-
dication of rights, it appears that the Court is employing the
criminal process to formulate social policy.6 2 Federal judicial over-
sight of a state agency such as the police, which the state has equal
resources to supervise, raises concerns of federalism. 3 While the
(Court refused to dismiss indictment of white defendant who alleged discrimination against
blacks in jury foreman selection); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980)
(Court refused to expand standing to assert fourth amendment claims).
58 Professor Beale asserts that exclusion of evidence or dismissal of the prosecution, in
the absence of a constitutional violation, "impairs the President's ability to enforce the laws
and frustrates the substantive criminal law enacted by Congress." Beale, supra note 54, at
1521. See also Note, supra note 53, at 447-49 (proposes bifurcated inquiry to avoid separa-
tion conflicts: whether benefits of exclusion outweigh its costs to courts and whether exclu-
sion impermissibly intrudes upon executive's function). But see McNabb, 318 U.S. at 347
("We are not concerned with law enforcement practices except in so far as courts themselves
become instruments of law enforcement").
"' See Beale, supra note 54, at 1473-74.
10 See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 582 (1981); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33
(1963). The Chandler Court acknowledged that "[The Supreme Court is] not empowered by
the Constitution to oversee or harness state procedural experimentation; only when the
state action infringes fundamental guarantees are we authorized to intervene." 449 U.S. at
582.
" See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 570, 582-83.
62 See Seidman, supra note 26, at 436. Professor Seidman analogizes the Burger and
Warren Courts' use of the criminal trial to achieve ends other than the adjudication of guilt.
See id. at 445-46. The Warren Court sought to achieve greater civil rights, id. at 430-45,
whereas the Burger Court apparently stressed crime prevention and control. Id. at 436-38.
The current Court uses exclusion to protect the "collective interest of society" in deterring
fourth amendment violations. See Doernberg, "The Right of the People". Reconciling Col-
lective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259, 273,
280 (1983).
63 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458, 459 n.35 (1976). The Janis Court rec-
ognized the "undesirable supervisory role over police officers." Id. at 458. But see Comment,
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need to maintain judicial integrity underlies the doctrine of super-
visory power, such a rationale does not support exclusion of crucial
evidence. 4 As one of several remedies, none of which is an integral
part of fourth amendment jurisprudence, the imposition of the ex-
clusionary rule upon the states directly impinges upon the state's
legitimate authority to select an appropriate remedy for aggrieved
parties.
FEDERALISM CONCERNS
The language of the Supremacy Clause,65 coupled with the
lack of creation of inferior federal courts in the Constitution, 6
demonstrates that the Framers contemplated state court adjudica-
tion of federal constitutional questions.6 7 The Supreme Court's au-
thority to review state court determinations of federal law is firmly
Judicially Required Rulemaking as Fourth Amendment Policy: An Applied Analysis of the
Supervisory Power of Federal Courts, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 595, 614 (1978) (proposes more
flexible exercise of supervision by federal courts over law officials and agencies). The federal
courts could "bridge the hiatus" between the police and the judiciary by having the police
demonstrate an effectively administered investigative policy within the agency to protect
fourth amendment rights. See id. at 629. The judiciary would retain power to review compli-
ance therewith. See id. at 604-05. It is submitted that such a system on the state level,
between the local police and the state courts, is a viable alternative to exclusion. Moreover,
problems of federalism would thereby be avoided.
" See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976). The Stone Court concluded that
maintenance of judicial integrity "has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of
highly probative evidence." 428 U.S. at 485. Justice Rehnquist expressly rejected its applica-
bility to exclusion in state proceedings because of its supervisory nature. See California v.
Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 924 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In addition, there is doubt as
to whether exclusion promotes judicial integrity. See Cameron & Lustiger, The Exclusion-
ary Rule: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 101 F.R.D. 109, 131 (1984) (disparity between error com-
mitted and windfall afforded likely to stir up public hostility toward government).
65 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause provides in relevant part- "This Con-
stitution... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing." Id. (emphasis added).
66 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The absence of inferior federal courts at the time of the
making of the Constitution is evident in the discretionary language of the Constitution with
respect to the creation of such courts: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." Id. (emphasis added).
67 See Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 638 (1884); see also Welsh, Reconsidering the
Constitutional Relationship Between State and Federal Courts: A Critique of Michigan v.
Long, 59 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 1118, 1133-41 (1984) (pros and cons of using Framers' ambiv-
alence and supremacy clause as justification for current theory on Supreme Court-state
court relations). In conjunction with their authority to hear federal constitutional claims,
the states are to use their general remedial authority to redress any violations. See Hill,
Constitutional Remedies, supra note 31, at 1113.
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established by statute s" and case law.69 However, when state courts
are called upon to interpret federal constitutional provisions which
involve individual rights, an unavoidable tension ensues between
state autonomy and federal uniformity.70
Federalism has been a particular goal of the Burger Court as it
attempts to allow the states greater leeway from federal re-
straints.7' Respect for the autonomy of the state judiciary has been
most evident with respect to the states' traditional role as criminal
justice administrator.7 2 Implicit in the Court's balancing approach
to the exclusionary rule is its deference to state courts' expertise
and familiarity with local conditions. 73 Former Chief Justice Bur-
ger, among others, has advocated increased experimentation by the
states in formulating remedies for fourth amendment violations.74
08 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
69 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (review of state criminal
proceeding); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (same). The authority
of the Supreme Court to review state court judgments became truly effective after the ratifi-
cation of the fourteenth amendment. See Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Proce-
dure, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1956).
70 See L. TRBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-33, at 122 (1978). Professor Tribe
views the Court's role as entailing the determination of "whether state autonomy threatens
federal interests to such an extent that uniformity must prevail." Id. Professor Schaefer
characterizes the conflict between state autonomy and federal uniformity as one between a
strong local interest in law enforcement and a competing "ideal" of fair procedure. See
Schaefer, supra note 69, at 5.
71 See Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the
Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 451 (1974). The Burger Court's decentralizing tendencies in
the criminal justice area have been compared to Justice Harlan's views. See id. Justice
Harlan believed that state criminal justice systems should be free of federal constitutional
restraints so long as they abided by standards of fundamental fairness. See id. He advocated
disuniformity between the two levels of government because "[t]he powers and responsibili-
ties of the State and Federal Governments are not congruent, and under the Constitution
they are not intended to be." Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 616 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). But see Welsh, Whose Federalism? - The Burger Court's Treatment of State
Civil Liberties Judgments, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 819, 819-20, 856-58 (1983) (Burger
Court's approach prohibiting states to grant greater protection is hypocritical).
72 See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117,
120 (1951). The Irvine Court recognized that the "chief burden of administering criminal
justice rests upon the state courts." 347 U.S. at 134. Deference to the states in the criminal
justice area is historically rooted; it was not until the twentieth century that the fourteenth
amendment was extended to state criminal proceedings. See THE SECOND ROUND, supra note
42, at 39.
73 Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680-81 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "Problems of crimi-
nal law enforcement vary widely from State to State." Id. Justice Harlan concluded: "In my
view this Court should continue to forbear from fettering the States with an adamant rule
which may embarrass them in coping with their own peculiar problems in criminal law en-
forcement." Id. at 681.
74 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
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Critics reject such experimentation and stress that the detachment
of the Supreme Court from local crime and political pressures is
crucial to the effective protection of individual rights.75 This latter
argument, however, poses problems for state courts which seek to
apply standards formulated haphazardly by the Supreme Court.76
In preserving state judicial autonomy, two concepts emerge:
comity"7 and finality of state court judgments.78 While these two
concepts were intended to support the Pullman 9 doctrine of fed-
eral abstention from interference with pending state court pro-
ceedings,80 it is submitted that they apply similarly to direct re-
388, 423-24 (1971) (Burger, J., dissenting). Former Chief Justice Burger urged Congress to
expressly waive its sovereign immunity as to illegal acts of law enforcement officials and to
create a specific cause of action for damages arising out of fourth amendment violations. See
id. at 422-23. As part of this proposal, Burger called for an express provision stating that
this statutory remedy is in lieu of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 423. He would allow the
states to formulate their own remedies in accordance with this "federal model." See id. at
423-24.
11 See, e.g., Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1352, 1359
(1970) (federal court can be more impartial in balancing state interests against individual
rights); Wisdom, Foreword: The Ever-Whirling Wheels of American Federalism, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1063, 1073 (1984) (if left to state courts, civil liberties would suffer).
76 See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954) ("inconstant and inconsistent" fed-
eral standards caused by haphazard approach). The random selection of cases used by the
Court to formulate general standards and the disagreement among the Justices within a
particular case render the critics' arguments less sound. See Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-
American Mistake, 19 DE PAuL L. REV. 80, 89-91 (1969); Schaefer, supra note 69, at 6.
7 See L. TRIBE, supra note 70, at § 3-39, at 147-48. Tribe defines "comity" as:
[T]he fundamental premise of judicial federalism which holds that, since both
federal and state courts have a duty to enforce the Constitution, there is no con-
stitutional basis, in the absence of some infirmity in the state judicial process it-
self, for preferring federal to state courts as adjudicators of federal constitutional
claims.
Id.
I 8 See L. TRIBE, supra note 70, at § 3-39, at 148-49 n.3. Tribe outlines two requisites for
a judgment to be "final": first, "the decision must 'be subject to no further review or correc-
tion in any other state tribunal,"' id. (quoting Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324
U.S. 548, 551 (1945)); and second, "the state court decision must also be 'an effective deter-
mination of the litigation and not of merely interlocutory or intermediate steps,'" id. (quot-
ing Market St., 324 U.S. at 551). See generally Note, Relitigation of Fourth Amendment
Claims Under Section 1983: Federalism and the Illusory Right to a Federal Forum, 1980 U.
ILL. L.F. 783, 794 (discusses finality in context of section 1983).
79 See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
80 See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500. The doctrine of federal court abstention from pending
state proceedings, grounded on comity and finality considerations, has been applied to crim-
inal proceedings in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971) and Stefanelli v. Minard,
342 U.S. 117, 120-21 (1951). See L. TRIBE, supra note 70, at §§ 3-40 to 41, at 149-56 (dis-
cusses above mentioned cases). See also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 539, 542 (1976)
(employs these two concepts in habeas corpus setting).
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view of final judgments. Inherent in the abstention doctrine is the
recognition of state court competence in adjudicating federal con-
stitutional claims.8' The possibility of reversal of state court con-
victions based upon unclear Supreme Court guidelines severely un-
dermines both the criminal justice system and the system of
federalism. 2 This is particularly so when the reversal is grounded
in such substantive matters as exclusion of highly probative
evidence.8 3
Judicial concerns for principles of federalism have been mani-
fested in varying trends in the Court's treatment of individual lib-
erties.84 In response to the Burger Court's retrenchment of individ-
ual liberties, some state courts, having adjusted to the highly
protective policies of the Warren Court, have revitalized their own
state constitutional provisions to grant greater protection." The
Burger Court's antagonism toward overly expansive interpretations
of the federal Constitution was most clearly evidenced in its modi-
fication of the longstanding "adequate and independent" state
81 See Note, supra note 78, at 794.
82 See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954) (state courts' fear of federal reversal
based upon inconstant standards is unjustified).
83 See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 557-58, 564 (1979). The Rose Court considered
suppression of evidence to be significantly more detrimental than quashing an 'indictment.
Id. at 564. Although an accused may be rendered immune from prosecution if highly proba-
tive evidence is suppressed, the quashing of an indictment may allow the state to begin
anew. Id.
I See generally Swindler, Minimum Standards of Constitutional Justice: Federal
Floor and State Ceiling, 49 Mo. L. REV. 1, 1-11 (1984) (outlines Court's trends in twentieth
century with respect to individual rights: Lochner era; judicial restraint; sixties' nationaliza-
tion; and current retrenchment).
" See, e.g., People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y. 2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985)
(uses state constitutional provision and declines to apply Leon good faith exception); People
v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985) (rejects Gates totality
of circumstances test and adheres to Aguilar-Spinelli probable cause standard); Common-
wealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 66, 470 A.2d 457, 468 (1983) (reads "automatic standing" rule,
previously rejected by Supreme Court, into state constitution); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash.
2d 432, 435, 688 P.2d 136, 139 (1984) (adopting Aguilar-Spinelli standard). See also Abra-
hamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional
Law, 63 TAx. L. REV. 1141, 1156-93 (discusses various states' experimentation with own con-
stitutions and reasons therefor); Wilkes, supra note 71, at 435-43 (cites examples of state
courts evading Burger Court retrenchment); Note, Of Laboratories and Liberties: State
Court Protection of Political and Civil Rights, 10 GA. L. REv. 533, 533-49 (1976) (states
taking up "activist philosophy" of Warren Court and extending rights via own constitu-
tions). One commentator suggests that some recurring themes in these activist decisions
include regional ideas of individual liberty, freedom from federalism constraints, desire for
state autonomy, and possible "linguistic variations" from federal provisions. See id. at 550.
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ground doctrine in Michigan v. Long. 6 The Long Court warned
that appellate jurisdiction would be exercised over state court
judgments unless it is "clear from the face of the opinion" that the
state court is relying upon an adequate state ground.87 This indi-
cates the Burger Court's disagreement with the expansive fourth
amendment interpretations of many state courts. Regardless of the
grounds upon which it relies, it is clear that the state must, at the
very least, abide by the minimum federal constitutional require-
ments.8" However, as demonstrated by the Court's current inter-
pretation of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, the defini-
tion of the minimum federal standard for vindicating fourth
amendment rights remains an open issue.
RECOMMENDED STANDARDS AND ALTERNATIVES
The Burger Court has granted state courts the authority to
balance the interest of the individual against those of society to
determine whether or not to exclude evidence obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment.8 It is suggested that the advantages of
the balancing process are most evident at the remedial stage,
rather than during the primary determination of whether or not a
so 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). The Burger Court's anti-expansionism first emerged in Califor-
nia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), in which the Court ruled that the California Supreme
Court's interpretation of the sixth amendment confrontation clause was erroneous because
it was overly expansive. See id. at 164. See also Welsh, supra note 71, at 819-29 (author sees
antagonism as hostility toward individual rights).
87 Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41.
See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Brown v. State, 657 S.W. 2d 797, 799
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Schlulter, Judicial Federalism and Supreme Court Review of State
Court Decisions: A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1100 (1984).
81 See supra note 23 (balance extends beyond grand jury setting and "fruits of the
poisonous tree" situations). Balancing is particularly useful in fashioning equitable reme-
dies. See Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 593 (1983). Professor Gewirtz
discusses two types of remedies-rights maximizing and interest balancing. See id. at 588-
89. Gewirtz apparently approves of interest balancing when federalism issues are involved.
See id. at 600 n.32. This remedy balances the "net remedial benefits" to the aggrieved party
against the net costs it imposes on a "broader range of social interests." Id. at 591. The
concept of rights maximizing focuses upon which remedy will be most effective in eliminat-
ing adverse consequences of the violation suffered by the aggrieved party. See id. Under this
theory, a remedy which is not completely effective will be permitted only if a more effective
remedy is impossible to achieve. See id. at 593. Gewirtz would support a less effective rem-
edy if the societal interests involved were very important. See id. at 592. Despite his pri-
mary emphasis upon racial desegregation remedies, it is submitted that this concept of in-
terest balancing at the remedial stage, closely allied with the Calandra test, is valid in the
search and seizure contest.
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constitutional violation has occurred 0 In keeping with the Court's
emphasis on deterrence, primary stage balancing should be mini-
mal, because it is at this point that clear guidelines are needed as
to what constitutes a reasonable search and seizure.9 1 Furthermore,
different interests are considered at each stage: At the primary
stage, the immediate necessity of the official's action is considered
in determining its reasonableness; 92 the more long-range societal
costs to the criminal justice system are weighed at the remedial
stage."
A Questioning of the Remedial Value of the Rule
A remedy's effectiveness is measured both by its ability to
compensate for the present violation and by its success as a deter-
rent.9 4 The Burger Court's holdings clearly question the value of
the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to fourth amendment viola-
tions.9 5 The rule has also been attacked as an inequitable compen-
" See Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment, 93
YALE L.J. 1127, 1145 (1984). See also Gewirtz, supra note 89, at 678-79. Professor Gewirtz
discusses the dichotomy between the rights-declaring stage and the remedial stage. See id.
The judge's role in the earlier stage is to be unaffected by politics and personal beliefs. In
the second stage, however, a judge may have to weigh these factors in order to give the term
"reasonable search and seizure" a concrete meaning. See id. It is submitted that a need for
clarification of the "ideal" provides an educational tool to law enforcement entities.
91 See supra note 5. Interests to be weighed at the "reasonableness" stage should be
limited to any immediate danger to the police officer and the surrounding public. See Note,
supra note 90, at 1145.
92 See generally Gewirtz, supra note 89, at 593-98 (balancing recognizes "unavoidable
remedial imperfection" and multiple goals). Specifically, in the search and seizure context,
application of a balancing approach at the remedial stage avoids disproportionate results,
favors fundamental fairness, and serves to replace the piecemeal exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule. See Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 64, at 151. But see Note, supra note 90, at
1145 (Court should develop objective criteria that must be met before before invoking
balancing).
'3 See supra note 26 (exclusion deflects truth finding process of trial). Other relevant
factors include the consequences of releasing guilty individuals and the effect of such a re-
lease on crime deterrence. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490-91 (1976). See generally
Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 64, at 132 (three categories of costs of exclusionary rule).
Additionally, there are further administrative costs in the form of clogging the courts and
slowing the judicial process. See id.
N See J. HIRSCHEL, supra note 2, at 1; Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573, 582 (1971). Judge Wilkey suggests two additional objectives of
a remedy in the search and seizure context, namely, to keep the guilty from being released
and to provide effective guidance to the police. See Wilkey, Enforcing the Fourth Amend-
ment by Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, reprinted in 95 F.R.D. 211, 229-43 (1982).
91 See supra notes 28 (where officers believe their actions are consistent with fourth
amendment, exclusionary sanction does not deter). Professor Oaks distinguishes between
1986]
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satory device in that it overcompensates victims who are guilty in
fact by immunizing them from prosecution," while it fails to com-
pensate innocent victims for the harassment suffered at the hands
of fourth amendment violators.97 A viable alternative must compel
fourth amendment compliance and fair compensation of all victims
of illegal searches and seizures. Although a number of commenta-
tors have suggested alternatives to the exclusionary rule, none have
been practically effective in serving the several purposes of the
rule."' The imposition of criminal penalties upon offending police
officers has been infrequent due to prosecutorial reluctance in
bringing charges against law enforcement agents,99 and the heavy
evidentiary burden of proving intent in such cases. 100 Furthermore,
it is unlikely that a jury will convict a police officer when the com-
plaining witness is an accused or convicted criminal.' 0'
The utilization of injunctive relief and contempt sanctions
general deterrence and special deterrence. See Oaks, supra note 20, at 709-12. Special deter-
rence is the effect of a sanction on an individual who has already been subject to same by
his past misconduct. See id. at 709. General deterrence includes both the direct effect of
compliance through the threat of a sanction and the indirect effect of conforming one's gen-
eral behavioral patterns to avoid the threat of punishment. Id. at 710-11. Oaks considers the
exclusionary rule to be insufficient as a special deterrent since it does not entail direct pun-
ishment of the erring official. See id. at 709-10.
"6 See Oaks, supra note 28, at 749-50. Exclusion of highly probative tangible evidence
most often results in total immunization from prosecution for a crime committed. See id.;
WILKEY, supra note 94, at 211. Judge Cardozo, in People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E.
585 (1926), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926), set forth this illustrative scenario: "The crimi-
nal is to go free because the constable has blundered .... A room is searched against the
law, and the body of a murdered man is found.... [t]he privacy of the home has been
infringed, and the murderer goes free." Id. at 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. at 587-88.
97 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 417-18 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). As a remedial device, the exclusionary rule fails
in instances when the police "seek to achieve control over crime through methods which are
more direct from their point of view, like harassment or abuse of offending citizens." B.
GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 135-36 (1966). Con-
trol over such activities as gambling, prostitution and open homosexual activity appears to
be most often subject to this unlawful police harassment. See id.
9' See Oaks, supra note 28, at 673.
99 See Geller, supra note 8, at 713-15. (1975). Professor Geller suggests that prosecutors
who must work with police on a daily basis will be reluctant to seek sanctions against their
crime-fighting allies. See id.; Hall, The Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 3 CRIM. JUST.
J. 303, 312 (1980).
100 See Wingo, supra note 94, at 580. A prosecutor would, at minimum, need to prove
negligence on the part of the police officer in order for criminal sanctions to be imposed. See
id. However, it would appear unfair to impose criminal liability for mere negligence. See id.
101 See Oaks, supra note 28, at 673. The problem of jury bias in favor of police officers
cannot be avoided in criminal prosecutions by requiring bench trials owing to the sixth
amendment right to a trial by jury "[iln all criminal prosecutions." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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have similarly been dismissed.10 2 Likewise, internal disciplinary
programs have not yet been recognized as an effective substitute
for exclusion.103 Such a program would require close judicial super-
vision because of the inevitable camaraderie amongst coworkers.0'
External review boards established by the municipalities and com-
prised predominantly of civilians well-versed in police procedure
might provide a more objective forum. 0 5 Former Chief Justice
Burger has advocated the establishment of such boards and has
recommended that they be granted powers similar to those of
grand juries. 06 These boards appear viable so long as their actions,
like all administrative determinations, are subject to judicial
review.107
The common law remedy for unreasonable searches and
seizures consisted of a tort action in trespass 08 supplemented by
102 See Comment, Contempt of Court as an Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule, 72 J.
CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 993, 997 (1981) (questionable applicability of contempt sanction);
Geller, supra note 98, at 715-17. The injunctive remedy has little force in search and seizure
law because most often the violation is a single incident. See id. at 717. See Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160,, 182 (1949) (Jackson J., dissenting) (innocent citizens cannot
anticipate unreasonable searches in order to seek injunctive relief). It was appropriate, how-
ever, in Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966), where the police continually
searched dwellings in a black community without probable cause. See id. at 202.
103 See Geller, supra note 98, at 718. "The notion . . . that police departments will
regulate themselves. . . is greeted skeptically by the public. . . it is doubtful. . . that the
protection of our constitutional rights can be entrusted to the same group against whose
zealousness the rights were given." Id.
104 See Oaks, supra note 28, at 674; Geller, supra note 58, at 718.
100 See Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 16 (1964); Wingo,
supra note 94, at 581. Former Chief Justice Burger recommends that the civilian review
board be independent of, but cooperative with, the police department. See id. at 16. Some
commentators argue that external review boards (as well as internal disciplinary proceed-
ings) have great deterrence potential because of the direct impact of the penalties invoked
against the officer. See Burger, supra, at 15; Wilkey, supra note 94, at 230-31; Wingo, supra
note 94, at 581. Some suggested disciplinary measures include a penalty against the officer, a
reprimand, a fine, a delay in promotion, a suspension, or discharge. See Wilkey, supra note
94, at 230.
106 See Burger, supra note 105, at 17-23. Burger recommended that the Board be em-
powered to subpoena witnesses and that it have access to police records. See id. The Board
should likewise receive general immunity from liability. See id. Its primary task would be to
recommend disciplinary action to be taken against the officer based upon its findings. See
id. at 18-19. The Board would also have the power to direct that the police agency inquire
into its own general procedures. See id. In a particularly egregious case, the Board would be
able to recommend dismissal of the offending officer. See id. In Bivens, Burger urged the
formation of a quasi-judicial tribunal on the federal level as a remedy to a fourth amend-
ment violation patterned after the Court of Claims. See 403 U.S. at 423 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
107 See Wilkey, supra note 94, at 230 (judicial review of administrative remedy).
'o See supra note 8 (discussing common law action for trespass).
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statutory tort actions. 09 However, these remedies are beset with
judgment collection problems. First, although the deterrent effect
would be greatest if recovery was directly from the offending of-
ficer, 110 it has been argued that compensation should be provided
by the government because of the possibility that the officer will be
judgment-proof.1'1 Second, a greater obstacle to recovery is sover-
eign immunity.11 2 In one proposed system of recovery, the govern-
ment, having waived sovereign immunity, would pay the amount
above which the officer is unable to pay and would later recover
the money by garnishing his salary." 3 The difficulty of proving
damages in cases of fourth amendment violations presents yet an-
other obstacle to recovery." 4 This obstacle could be removed by
establishing a minimum amount recoverable which could be fixed
by statute.115 Punitive damages and reasonable attorney's fees
10I See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (constitutional tort action against state or munici-
pal official).
110 See Geller, supra note 8, at 694-95. Geller argues that liability insurance minimizes
the effect of a tort suit against an officer as a deterrent because the insurance works an
indirect recovery from the officer. See id. He poses a similar argument against an action
against the government entity. See id.
.. See Geller, supra note 8, at 695; Note, The Decline of the Exclusionary Rule: An
Alternative to Injustice, 4 Sw. U.L. REv. 68, 81 (1972). One method employed in Canada is a
tort action against the chief constable of the police force and the provincial police commis-
sioner based upon the theory of respondeat superior. See Oaks, supra note 28, at 701-09.
However, its feasibility is questionable when applied in the larger cities of the United
States. See id. at 706-09.
" See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 422-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In his proposed statutory
remedy to the exclusionary rule, Former Chief Justice Burger acknowledged the problem of
sovereign immunity and suggested that it be waived in cases of illegal police conduct. See id.
Congress subsequently waived immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Pub. L. No.
93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982)). The statute was passed in
response to the "no-knock" raids then being conducted by federal narcotics agents. See S.
REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
2789, 2790-91.
"' See Levin, An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule for Fourth Amendment Viola-
tions, 58 JUDICATURE 75, 76 (1974). In this proposed system of recovery, the governmental
entity would be reimbursed for the full amount of damages it has paid if the officer's con-
duct was intentional. See id. If the officer's conduct was grossly negligent, a penalty would
be attached to the officer's salary and would increase in amount for each violation. Id.
114 See Geller, supra note 8, at 693; Wingo, supra note 94, at 579. A lack of actual
injury as the direct result of the unlawful search was earlier noted by Justice Murphy in his
dissent in Wolf, 338 U.S. at 42-43. Often the damages would be nominal in a trespass action
because they are limited to physical injury to one's property. Id. at 43.
"I See Geller, supra note 8, at 703; see also Note, supra note 111, at 80 (statutory
provisions setting minimum amounts recoverable not uncommon, particularly in civil rights
area). Examples of damages recoverable by a victim later prosecuted may include bail ex-
penses, court costs, attorney's fees for representation in the criminal prosecution, damage to
property, and lost income but not the fines paid as a result of a conviction. See Geller, supra
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could be assessed as both additional deterrents and compensation
for the costs of bringing the suit.11
The Solution: Tort Liability Determined at a Mini-Trial
Despite this litany of obstacles, it is submitted that effective
legislation and administration will enable a tort action for damages
to be a viable alternative to the exclusionary rule. Further, the
"mini-trial" model proposed by Judge Wilkey1 7 would provide a
sound forum for the determination of such damages. This model
requires the initiation of a proceeding immediately after the crimi-
nal proceeding in which the constitutional violation is originally al-
leged.11 8 The advantage of this procedure is that it provides for the
speedy determination of the constitutional issue and any economic
damages by a judge who is already familiar with the facts in dis-
pute.119 A trial by jury is not required because of the civil nature of
the proceeding,120 thus eliminating the problem of jury bias.1 2'
Furthermore, this "summary proceeding" would no more increase
a court's docket than does a suppression hearing.122
Despite arguments favoring national uniformity, it is submit-
ted that it is patently unfair that the varying factual circumstances
of each case should be ignored by applying the exclusionary rule
indiscriminately.1 23 The utilization of the "mini-trial" method
note 8, at 701.
Il See Geller, supra note 8, at 709-11. It is submitted that awards of attorney's fees
and punitive damages must be provided through legislation. This is particularly so with
respect to punitive damages, which often are not recoverable in the absence of actual dam-
ages. See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 43 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
M See Wilkey, supra note 94, at 231; Wilkey, Constitutional Alternatives to the Ex-
clusionary Rule, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 531, 538 (1982).
I8 See Wilkey, supra note 94, at 231. The complainant would bear the burden of prov-
ing the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 232.
11o Id. This post-trial proceeding also remedies the problem of representation by coun-
sel. It is submitted that in the legislative scheme establishing this mini-trial, an indigent
should be able to retain his state-appointed counsel for the purposes of litigating this consti-
tutional claim. Cf. Geller, supra note 8, at 696 (provision for some form of aid for indigent
plaintiffs necessary to make tort remedy meaningful); Oaks, supra note 28, at 717-18 (same).
120 Cf. supra note 101 (constitutional right to jury trial encompasses only "all criminal
prosecutions").
121 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982) (remedial legislation against government where jury bias
eliminated by non-provision of jury trial).
122 See Wilkey, supra note 94, at 236.
'13 See Wilkey, supra note 94, at 224. An oft-cited flaw of the exclusionary rule is its
failure to discriminate between the degrees of culpability of the officer or the degrees of
harm to the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Id. In addition, the rule does not distin-
guish amongst degrees of crimes allegedly committed by the accused. Id. at 224. See also
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would tailor each resolution of a fourth amendment violation to
the particular facts of each case. The "mini-trial" would need to
satisfy the standards of due process, and provide the essential ele-
ments of notice and an opportunity to be heard by a competent
tribunal with respect to the constitutional claim. Failure to comply
with these minimum standards would be reversible error. 124
According to Judge Wilkey, a "courageous" judge could initi-
ate the mini-trial alternative. 125 The trial judge could reserve judg-
ment on a motion to suppress until the main trial was concluded
and then conduct a hearing on the conduct of the officer.126 If the
officer's actions did not violate the fourth amendment, the convic-
tion would stand; if his actions were violative, the conviction would
stand if and only if appropriate disciplinary action was taken
against the erring officer.127 If such a procedure was implemented,
Judge Wilkey maintains, "the Supreme Court itself would leap at
the chance to validate the district judge's action in creating a new
and viable effective deterrent to police action violating the Fourth
Amendment.' 28 Finally, it is submitted that Judge Wilkey's
"mini-trial model" presents an appropriate substitute for the ex-
clusionary rule, and would effectively deter unreasonable search
and seizure as well as provide a forum in which an aggrieved victim
may seek redress.
CONCLUSION
The Burger Court's balancing approach to the application of
the fourth amendment exclusionary remedy seems to indicate that
exclusion is not constitutionally required in all cases. While
stressing deterrence as the primary purpose of exclusion, the Court
itself has expressed doubts as to its effectiveness. This Note has
asserted that imposition of the exclusionary rule upon the states to
cure fourth amendment violations constitutes an impermissible ex-
ercise of the Court's supervisory power over a state court's rightful
Hall, supra note 99, at 313 (reporting American Law Institute's balancing test providing for
flexible modification of exclusionary rule). It is for these reasons that other remedies are
preferred because they can be tailored to fit the surrounding circumstances. See Wingo,
supra note 94, at 584-85 (criticizing exclusionary rule's inflexibility).
124 See L. TRIBE, supra note 70, at 123.
125 See Wilkey, supra note 94, at 240.
:2 See id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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authority to select an appropriate remedy for the violation. In-
stead, it is suggested that the Court return to its earlier approach
permitting state courts to fashion their own remedies in cases of
fourth amendment violations. Finally, it is recommended that a
"mini-trial" tort action for damages against both the officer and
governmental entity involved would best enforce fourth amend-
ment rights via its twin aims of deterrence and compensation.
Karen C. Keller
